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Abstract
Several approaches to causal inference from observational studies have been
proposed. Since the the proposal of Rubin (1974) many works have developed
a counterfactual approach to causality, statistically formalized by potential out-
comes. Pearl (2000) has put forward a theory of structural causal models which
gives an important role to graphical models and do not necessarily use potential
outcomes. On the other hand several authors have developed a dynamical approach
in line with Granger (1969). We analyze prospective and retrospective causal ques-
tions and their different modalities. Following Dawid (2000) we develop criticisms
about the potential outcome approach and we show that causal effects can be esti-
mated without potential outcomes: in particular direct computation of the marginal
effect can be done by a change of probability measure. Finally, we highlight the
need to adopt a dynamic approach to causality through two examples, “truncation
by death” and the “obesity paradox”.
keywords: causality; obesity paradox; inverse probability weighting; potential out-
comes; truncation by death; stochastic system
1 Introduction
Since it was proposed by Fisher (1935), the method of randomized trials has been a
very important tool for establishing causality. The need for a formalism with greater
generality and applicable to observational studies, however, has appeared. The use of
potential outcomes has first been proposed by Jerzy Neyman in 1923 (Splawa-Neyman,
1990). The idea was revived and formulated in modern notation by Rubin (1974). Since
then, causal inference based on potential outcomes has been developed in a series of
papers and has become the dominant school of causal inference in Biostatistics and is
also influent in other fields such as econometrics (Heckman, 2005). This theory was
reviewed by Holland (1986) and Rubin (2005) among others. Robins and coworkers
used the potential outcomes approach to more complex problems, in particular to the
problem of dynamic treatment regimes (Robins et al., 2000; Robins and Herna´n, 2009).
Pearl (2000, 2009) has put forward a theory of structural causal models which gives
an important role to graphical models and do not necessarily use potential outcomes.
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On the other hand several authors have attempted to approach causality through
dynamical models. This has been first proposed by Granger (1969) working with
time series, and has been given a more powerful formalism by the works of Schweder
(1970) and Aalen (1987), further developed by Arjas and Parner (2004) and Didelez
(2008). This approach is particularly well adapted for studying feedback and mediation
(Aalen et al., 2012, 2018). Of course the use of a dynamical model is not sufficient for
causal interpretation but it is possible to formalize the assumption needed, particularly
through the concept of “system” elaborated in Commenges and Ge´gout-Petit (2009)
and in Chapter 9 of Commenges and Jacqmin-Gadda (2015). This stochastic system
approach to causality has similarity with Pearl’s structural causal models with the im-
portant difference that it is based on stochastic processes rather than simple random
variables.
The potential outcomes (or counterfactual) approach has been criticized by Dawid
(2000) and the title of this paper echoes Dawid’s paper. Indeed, it seems to us that
the approach using potential outcomes is not in line with the classical statistical and
probability theory and, partly because of this fact, raises a number of problems, both
theoretical and practical. It is not in line either with the concept of causality implicit in
physics. One aim of this paper is to review the different criticisms that can be addressed
to this approach. Some of them have already been raised by Dawid (2000) and Aalen
et al. (2012) and some of them are new. The other aim is to put forward the need of a
dynamic approach to causality.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we examine different types
of causal questions, distinguishing between prospective and retrospective questions. In
Section 3 we highlight several problematic issues about potential outcomes. In Section
4 we show that conditional and marginal effects can be defined and computed without
resorting to potential outcomes. In Section 5 we put forward the need of a dynamic
approach to causality and we illustrate its potentiality by two applications: treating the
problem of truncation by death and analysing the obesity paradox. Section 6 concludes.
2 The causal questions
2.1 Generalities
The “potential outcomes” concept is closely linked with that of “counterfactuals”; we
must first define (and distinguish) the two concepts. Potential outcomes are attributed
to each subject according to the value of a treatment variable. For instance in the
case of a binary treatment, each subject has two potential outcomes Yi(0) and Yi(1)
for treatments 0 and 1 respectively. Once the study is done, one of these variables is
“counterfactual” since subject i received either treatment 0 or 1; if subject i received
treatment 1, it goes “against the fact” to say that he received treatment 0; this means
of course that Yi(1) is observed but not Yi(0). While in this approach, the treatment
effect for subject i is defined as Yi(1) − Yi(0), it is clear that it cannot be computed
because only one the terms can be observed. This was called by Holland (1986) “the
fundamental problem of causality”. Thus the use of the potential outcomes implies
considering counterfactuals, but not all potential outcomes are counterfactual. Also we
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should distinguish counterfactual events and counterfactual questions.
2.2 Prospective (Qp) and retrospective (Qr) questions
In philosophy of science, an important distinction has been made between “general cau-
sation” and “singular, token” or “actual causation”. Hitchcock (2018) writes: “Gen-
eral causal claims, such “smoking causes lung cancer” typically do not refer to par-
ticular individuals, places, or times, but only to event-types or properties. Singular
causal claims, such as “Jills heavy smoking during the 2000s caused her to develop
lung cancer”, typically do make reference to particular individuals, places, and times.”
This distinction, however, is not precise enough because it mixes two different oppo-
sitions: prospective/retrospective and general/singular. In fact, the so-called “general
causation” questions are prospective, while token causation questions are retrospec-
tive. Dawid (2000) called the two types of questions “the effects of cause” and the “the
cause of the effect” and also noted that some effect of cause (prospective) questions
were in fact “singular”; Pearl (2015) also used this terminology. Since cause precedes
effect, this opposition is congruent with the prospective/retrospective opposition. The
opposition between “general” and “singular” is more a question of level of analysis:
for instance individual or population level (see Section 2.3). A prospective question
can be at the individual level, when the particular characteristics of an individual are
included in the model; personalized medicine, for instance, attempts to make individual
predictions and treatments (Chakraborty and Murphy, 2014).
A typical prospective question (effects of cause), denoted Qp, at the individual
level is: “What will be the difference in the outcome between the two actions: giving
treatment 0 or giving treatment 1 to subject i ?” This can be answered naturally, without
resorting to potential outcomes, by comparing the distributions of the outcome Y under
two different probability laws P0 and P1 obtained for treatment 0 and 1 respectively, in
a situation where we can manipulate the treatment (as in an experiment); for instance,
we can contrast them by considering E1(Y ) − E0(Y ). We have of course to estimate
P0 and P1 from observations. Qp is prospective, so does not imply counterfactuals,
since the fact has not yet been observed.
A typical retrospective question (cause of effect), denoted Qr , is: “Subject i has
experienced event Y = 1; what is the cause of this event”. It may happen that the
question is focused on a particular factor, for instance the treatment he took; assume
that he took treatment 0. One wonders whether taking treatment 0 took a role in the
subject experiencing Y = 1. If we know the probabilities of event Y = 1 after taking
treatment 0 and 1, respectively P0(Y = 1) and P1(Y = 1), we can contrast them,
using either a difference or a ratio. As for answering to Qp, we have in practice to
estimate P0 and P1 from observations. If P0(Y = 1) > P1(Y = 1), we may think
that taking treatment 0 rather than 1 is one of the causes of Y = 1 for subject i; of
course the magnitude of the contrast between P0(Y = 1) and P1(Y = 1) plays a role
in the causal attribution. Here the choice of the contrast is important (example of lung
cancer and smoking where a ratio indicates a large effect while a difference gives a
modest effect). Qr is retrospective. It has a more counterfactual flavour than Qp since
the facts are already there and we can ask “what if” subject had taken treatment 1 rather
than 0 ? However, we see that we can answer this counterfactual question by simply
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computing P1(Y = 1) and P0(Y = 1), that is without resorting to potential outcomes.
Arjas (1999) has solved some intriguing riddles in retrospective (token) causation
by resorting to latent variables.
2.3 Modalities of the Qp and Qr questions: individual vs popula-
tion levels, multiplicity
Both types of questions have several modalities. First they can pertain to the individual
or to the population level, and these levels are in interaction. We have formulated the
questions above at the individual level, but we can formulate them also at the population
level. Assume for simplicity that we can manipulate the prevalence of smoking as if
it was a treatment; the outcome of interest is the incidence of lung cancer in a given
population. The answer to the population-level Qp question, the effect of smoking
prevalence on incidence of lung cancer, can be deduced from the effect of smoking at
the individual level (although it involves here a rather complicated dynamic model). In
practice it is not possible to manipulate smoking prevalence but it may be possible to
modify it via an anti-tobacco campaign, which is really a “treatment” at the population
level; the effect of an anti-tobacco campaign on lung cancer incidence is mediated by
the smoking prevalence. This example raises the issue of the difference between the
causal effect of a “state” and the causal effect of an intervention, well described by
Pearl (2018, 2019) at the individual level.
In fact, the research on tobacco started with a Qr question for lung cancer. The
question, asked in the 1950’s (Breslow et al., 1954), was “what is the cause of the
increase in lung cancer incidence ?”. Of course, this question was asked because de-
scriptive studies had observed the fact of increasing incidence. Studies for finding risk
factors at individual level were then launched; they showed that smoking was an impor-
tant risk factor of lung cancer; moreover, it was also observed that smoking prevalence
had increased; it was deduced that the increase in smoking prevalence in the beginning
of the 20th century was responsible of the increase of lung cancer incidence in the sec-
ond part of the same century. This illustrates both the relation between individual and
population levels and Qp and Qr questions.
The other type of modalities arises from the possible multiplicity of effects and of
causes for Qp and Qr, respectively. An event may have several effects: an example
of the multiple Qp is the study of the effects of hormonal therapy on several diseases
such as cardiovascular diseases or cancer (Writing Group for the Women’s Health Ini-
tiative Investigators, 2002). In clinical trials a primary outcome is specified, but there
are often secondary outcomes, and also, side effects are examined. On the other hand,
an event may have several causes. In the case of lung cancer (a Qr question), one major
cause was found; this does not exclude the existence of other factors and it is not always
the case that one factor has a much larger impact than any other factor. An example
of multiple Qr is given by a study on Alzheimer’s disease. Epidemiologists record the
occurrence of the disease and also many factors which may possibly be risk factors;
low educational level and some genetic factors (like APO E4 allele) have been found.
Such studies allow us to learn the law of the system, that is the conditional probability
P(Y |Z) where Z are the possible causes; in simple analyses, Y is a random variable
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representing the disease of interest, Z is a vector of “explanatory” variables; in more
elaborated analyses, the disease and part of the potential risk factors may be represented
by stochastic processes as will be discussed in Section 5. Of course in any case, for
going from simple association to causal interpretation, much care must be exercised,
particularly to avoid conventional or dynamic confounding.
3 Problems with potential outcomes
As was said in the Introduction Section, many recent developments in the formalism
of causality have used the potential outcome approach. We develop here a criticism of
this approach.
3.1 A list of issues with the potential outcome approach
1. It is at odds with the Kolmogorov formalism and it may raise theoretical prob-
lems with continuous variables and continuous time
2. The status of random variables for the potential outcomes is not clear
3. The causal effect is defined in the sample while we want to extrapolate
4. There is most often no modeling of measurement error
5. The whole approach is influenced by randomized trials for one treatment while
in epidemiology causality is multiple
6. Most of the work focus on marginal effects while conditional effects are very
important
7. Time is not fully taken into account
As a consequence of these shortcomings, the potential outcome approach has dif-
ficulties for treating important causal problems such as mediation, truncation by death
(Section 5.2), dynamic selection (Section 5.3.1) and feedback (Section 5.3.2).
3.2 Points 1, 2 and 3: the probabilistic issues
The theoretical foundation of probability dates back from Kolmogorov (1933). In this
formalism, a random element is defined as an application from a space Ω equipped with
a sigma-algebra (or sigma-field), say Σ, to another space, also equipped with a sigma-
algebra. The sigma-algebra specifies which events an be given a probability. Random
elements are essentially random variables or stochastic processes. First consider the
case of a real random variable, Y . As presented by Williams (1991), Y is an application
from the “universe” (Ω,Σ) on to the real line (<,B), where (Ω,Σ) and (<,B); for each
element ω ∈ Ω the random variable takes the value Y (ω). Thus, in a sense, a random
variable has already potential outcomes! It is important to realize that there is no need
to specify a probability measure to specify the random elements: the random variable
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only specify which elements of < are associated to elements of Ω. Then, on these
measurable spaces we can put probability measures. A probability measure on (Ω,Σ)
induces a probability measure on (<,B) through the variable Y , which is called the
distribution of Y . One can assume that there is a true probability measure according to
which “Nature” chooses ω, which induces the true distribution of Y . Since what we can
call the “fundamental problem of statistics” is that we do not know the true probability,
we choose a family of probability measures (or of distributions) in which we hope
that the true probability measure lies; this is what is called a “statistical model”, and
if the hope is fulfilled, it is well-specified (Commenges, 2009). Then, the statistical
theory of inference allows to choose a distribution, based on observations, that is close
to the true distribution. All this is now conventional, but note that Neyman proposed
the potential outcome notation in 1923, before Kolmogorov proposed his formalism.
When using this formalism in presence of an explanatory variable A, conventional
statistics uses conditional probabilities, and for instance for a binary variable A, Y has
the distribution P0 if A = 0 and P1 if A = 1. Of course this does not make a “causal
model”, but this is the corner stone of the basic formalism that can be used for this aim.
The fact that “correlation is not causation” has been acknowledged for a long time in
statistics and epidemiology, and the concept of “confounding factor” has long been a
key concept in epidemiology.
Let us now examine the potential outcome formalism. In the formalism proposed
by Neyman and rejuvenated by Rubin (1974), the potential outcomes are fixed. Each
subject has a potential outcome Ya which is observed if he takes the treatment A = a.
The random elements are the treatment attribution or the label of the units. This is
clearly described in Rubin (2005). So, the potential outcomes does not seem to be
random variables. The effects are defined by E(Ya), where the expectation represents
a mean in the population.
Neyman and Iwaszkiewicz (1935) proposed design-based analysis using potential
outcomes. Note however that this can be done without potential outcomes. A particular
type of design-based analysis is analysis by randomisation tests studied by Pitman
(1937). In randomization tests the distribution of the test statistic used is conditional
on the outcome of interest and is generated by the randomization itself. Design-based
analysis such as in Lemeshow et al. (1998) also allows inference based on design in
observational studies. Limitations of design-based analysis are: (i) that we have to
extrapolate to the general population and (ii) more importantly, we have to specify a
statistic. The theory does not provide natural statistics but only yields the distribution
of pre-specified statistics; by contrast, the likelihood theory provides estimators and
test statistics with good properties.
3.3 Point 4: difficulty with modeling measurement error
In spite of a thorough analysis of “measurement bias” in Chapter 9 of Hernan and
Robins (2018), and recognising that assuming no measurement error is unrealistic, the
methods of causal inference based on potential outcome most often assume that there
is no measurement error: see Hernan and Robins (2018) Chapter 13.5. Note, however,
that Neyman (1935) introduced “technical errors”.
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3.4 Point 5: randomized trials for one treatment vs multiple causal-
ity
Hernan and Robins (2018) in Chapter 3 and Section 13.5 state that the analysis of obser-
vational data should emulate that of a hypothetical randomized experiment as closely
as possible. In most works using potential outcome the question is to assess the causal
effect of a treatment of a particular factor (like smoking). Moreover the values of the
treatment to be compared correspond to well defined interventions (consistency). As
important as it is, this problem does not cover all fields of application of causal infer-
ence. In epidemiology there are often several factors which influence the occurrence of
a disease in a complex way involving interactions. Moreover, it is possible to speak of
causal effect in cases where no intervention seem possible (effect of the moon on tides,
effect of genetic variants), or difficult (BMI). For BMI there is a cascade of effect:
“recommendation of diet” –> “effective diet” –> BMI –> mortality (see Pearl (2018)
for the effect of BMI contrasted with the effect of an intervention). Also the factors of
interest are often continuous and the effect shape may be complex (for instance U or J
shape for the effect of BMI on death rate).
3.5 Point 6: focus on marginal effects vs conditional effects
The focus of most of the literature using potential outcomes has been on marginal
effects. This is probably not an absolute limitation of the approach. For instance,
the marginal structural models have been extended to fixed covariates (Cole et al.,
2005). However the approach has not been used for analyzing complex effects of
several factors as may be required for developing personalized medicine. Moreover, the
potential outcomes approach does not seem to be able to incorporate random effects.
3.6 Point 7: time not fully taken into account
In a large body of the literature using potential outcome, time is only implicitly taken
into account. In simple contexts such as those of clinical trials where a treatment A is
given and an outcome Y is defined, it is implicit that A is given before the outcome Y
is observed and this may be sufficient in this case. However, in more complex models
there are several variables which are implicitly ordered and there may be direct and
indirect effect. Aalen et al. (2012) have shown how a model including time is superior
to a model which does not. One of the example is taken from Cole and Herna´n (2002).
Also Aalen et al. (2016) showed that discretization of time could lead to erroneous
causal interpretations. The possibility of a dynamic approach will be discussed in
Section 5.
Also, as analyzed by Aalen et al. (2019), in case of mediation, the natural direct ef-
fects and the natural indirect effects constructed with potential outcomes are ill-defined
in a survival context because the manipulation of the mediator at time t may make no
sense if the subject is dead or censored before this time.
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4 Causality without potential outcome in the random
variables context
4.1 The do operator and its probabilistic interpretation
Pearl (2000) has developed structural causal models (SCM) in which the causal effect
of a factor is defined by the ”do operator”. The do-operator is defined graphically by
cutting all the arrows pointing toward this factor. The aim is to define the effect of the
factor in a situation where it is not influenced by any other factor, as in a randomized
experiment.
For illustration, we consider the following simple setting depicted in Figure 1 (a):
there is a confounding factor C which influences both Y and A. We assume that
this is the only confounding factor (possibly multidimensional); that is, the situation
is that of no unmeasured confounders if we include C in the system. The graph of
Figure 1 (b) is that obtained by the do operator do A=a. The effect of A is defined
by E(Y |doA = a) This setting is described in Figure 1 b) ; it is similar to the “do
operator” of Pearl (2000). We do not need to invoke counterfactuals to describe it;
this is rather a conceptual situation, which may also be realized in the future; we do
not need either to use potential outcomes to analyse this setting. In this experimental
setting, the law of the three variables Y,A,C is given by a probability measure Pex;
in this law, the conditional distribution fY |A,C and the marginal distribution of C, fC ,
remain the same as in the observational setting, but C does not influence A, that is
f exA|C = f
ex
A 6= fA|C . This approach has been formalized by Arjas (2012).
4.2 Conditional and marginal effects
It is worth to note that both the researchers engaged in the potential outcome ap-
proach and Pearl have emphasized the importance of the marginal effect. This is
E(Y |doA = a) in in Pearl’ SCM and E(Ya) in the potential outcome approach ; con-
trasts for different values of A and other functional of the distribution can be consid-
ered. The effect thus defined is marginal. The conditional effects, however, appear to
be more and more important with the development of personalized medicine.
Pearl (2000) has studied the identifiability of the effect. The back-door and the
front-door criteria (not useful in our simple example) allow defining sets of variables
which are sufficient for computing the effect E(Y |doA = a). Our point here is to
note that the SCMs do not use potential outcome and that there is a probabilistic in-
terpretation of the do-operator. In fact a graph is a representation of properties of the
distributions of the variables in the system (here, conditional independence). So, for
instance in our example of Figure 1, we are just contemplating the influence graphs
of the system (Y,A,C) under a probability measure which is that of an observational
study for graph (a) and that of an experiment in graph (b). In our example we would
note the effect of “doing A = a” Ea(Y ), meaning that we compute the expectation
under the probability measure where we have fixed A to the value a; this can also be
noted Eex(Y |A = a), where Eex means expectation under an experimental measure
(where A is not influenced).
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4.3 Computation of marginal effects through conditional effects
The computation is of course the same as with the do operator:
∑
c Ea(Y |C = c)P (C =
c); both quantities Ea(Y |C = c) and P (C = c) can be estimated from an observational
study.
A formula valid when Y and C are continuous is:
Eex[Y |A] =
∫
yfY |A,C(y|A, c)fC(c) dy dc. (1)
These formulas are related to the “standardized mean” in epidemiology and called the
g-formula by Robins and Herna´n (2009). In an observational study, fY |A,C has to be
estimated.
There is nor potential outcome, nor counterfactual in this point of view. If A is
manipulable, the probability measure corresponding to ”do A=a” can be realized; if it
is not, it can still be considered from a mathematical point of view (Pearl, 2019).
C 
A Y 
C 
Y A 
(a) (b) 
Figure 1: Influence graphs for A, Y and C: a) observational study; b) experiment.
4.4 Computation of the marginal effects by inverse probability weight-
ing
Here we show in our simple setting, using random variables, how causal analysis
using IPTW can be derived without potential outcomes. With the idea to mimic a
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randomized trial, it has been proposed to directly estimate the marginal effect, with-
out estimating fY |A,C . If A is discrete, the marginal expectation of Y for A = a,
E[Ya], is simply estimated by a weighted mean of Y using unstabilized or stabilized
weights, W (A,C) = 1fA|C(A,C) and WS(A,C) =
fA(A)
fA|C(A|C) , respectively (Herna´n
and Robins, 2006); it is claimed (under positivity and exchangeability assumptions)
that E(Ya) = E[W (A,C)I(A = a)Y ]. However if A has a continuous distribution
this expression is problematic. Of course, in observational studies, fA and fA|C have
to be estimated.
If A is continuous (or can take a large number of values), a model is assumed
for the marginal effect of A and an estimation equation is proposed. In the potential
outcome formalism this is noted Eβ [Ya] = g(a;β). Assuming the marginal model
well-specified, a weighted estimation equation allows consistently estimating g(a;β∗);
the weighted estimation equation for a sample of size n, using stabilized weights is:
n∑
i=1
WS(Ai, Ci)D(Ai;β)[Yi − g(Ai;β)] = 0, (2)
where D(Ai;β) is the derivative of g(Ai;β) wrt β.
This result can be obtained in the classical framework, that is without using poten-
tial outcome. We wish to estimate the marginal expectation of Y for treatment value
A in the experimental situation, Eex[Y |A]. This can be done either non-parametrically
if A takes a small number of values, or parametrically if A is continuous or can take
a large number of values: Eex[Y |A = a] = g(a;β); even if there is one treatment
the parameter β is multidimensional. Acknowledging that Eex[Y |A] 6= Eobs[Y |A], the
problem is that of a change of probability measure in order to relate the model defined
in the experimental situation to the observations. The observation probability measure
Pobs is specified by the joint density of (Y,A,C), fobsY,A,C(y, a, c) which we write as
fobsY,A,C(y, a, c) = f
obs
Y |A,C(y, a|c)fobsA|C(a|c)fobsC (c).
Similarly, the joint density under the experimental probability measure is:
f exY,A,C(y, a, c) = f
ex
Y |A,C(y, a|c)f exA|C(a|c)f exC (c).
The physical law is represented by fY |A,C and does not change under different regime
of treatment attribution, so that fobsY |A,C(y, a|c) = f exY |A,C(y, a|c). We also choose an
experimental situation where f exC (c) = f
obs
C (c). We can compute the expectation in
the experiment from the expectation in the observational probability for any quantity
Q as:
Eex[Q] = Eobs[ZQ],
where Z is a random variable, with the property Eobs(Z) = 1, taking the value of
dPex
dPobs , the Radon-Nikodym derivative ofPex wrtPobs. The Radon-Nikodym derivative
exists provided that Pex is absolutely continuous wrt Pobs; this is related to the so-
called “positivity condition”. We have
dPex
dPobs =
f exY |A,C(y, a|c)f exA|C(a|c)f exC (c)
fobsY |A,C(y, a|c)fobsA|C(a|c)fobsC (c)
=
f exA (a)
fobsA|C(a|c)
.
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If we choose f exA (a) = f
obs
A (a), we have that Z =
fobsA (a)
fobs
A|C(a|c)
, which is equal to the
stabilized weight. It is not completely obvious that the same variable Z = WS works
for conditional probabilities but it can be verified that
Eex[Q|A] = Eobs[ZQ|A]. (3)
Non-parametric inference in the case where A takes a (small) finite number of
values by choosingQ = Y , a consistent estimator of Eex[Y |A = a] from an iid sample
of (Yi, Ai, Ci) is
1∑n
i=1 I(Ai = a)
n∑
i=1
I(Ai = a)ZiYi. (4)
More generally, estimation can be done using the weighted GEE given by Equation (2).
Using Equation (3) it is shown that this is an unbiased equation in the sense that, for all
i:
Eobs{WS(Ai, Ci)D(Ai;β)[Yi−g(Ai;β)]|Ai} = Eex{D(Ai;β)[Yi−g(Ai;β)]|Ai} = 0.
(5)
If we apply this equation to the simple case whereA can take a small number of values,
we retrieve the result of Equation (4). Equation (5) allows estimating a parametric
model which is necessary when the number of values of A is large.
Murphy et al. (2001) used this approach, recognizing that there was no need for
counterfactuals.
4.5 Estimation of the Marginal effect for time-varying exposure
with dynamic confounding
Robins (2000) has tackled the problem of dynamic confounding. With the aim to
avoid the sometimes difficult dynamic modeling, Robins et al. (2000) have proposed
the marginal structural models (MSM). However, similarly to the case with simple
exposure, marginal structural models can be designed without resorting to potential
outcomes. Exactly the same argument as in Section 4.4 can be applied and lead to
the stabilized weights proposed by Robins et al. (2000). Røysland (2011) has used
this change of measure approach to the more complex continuous case using Girsanov
theorem; see Ryalen et al. (2018) for an application.
Here also there is a natural way to estimate the marginal effect, first estimating a
dynamical model, then marginalizing in the law of an experiment, as we have done
in Section 4.3 in the non-dynamical case. Dynamical models have been proposed for
instance by Prague et al. (2017).
5 The stochastic system approach to causality
5.1 The stochastic system approach to causality
In line with the works of Aalen (1987), Arjas and Parner (2004) and Didelez (2008), the
stochastic system approach to causality has been presented in Commenges and Ge´gout-
Petit (2009), Commenges and Jacqmin-Gadda (2015) and Commenges (2018). The
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principle is to define causal influences in a system represented by stochastic processes
(rather than random variables), using the “local independence” concept. Intuitively, a
process Y is locally independent from a process V if information about V does not
change the predicted dynamics of Y . If Y is not locally independent of V , V directly
influences Y . This concept can be defined on a given finite horizon, and importantly,
on a random horizon. As in the simple framework of the Section 4, it is also possible to
compute marginal effects, either indirectly from conditional effects, or by a change of
measure (Røysland, 2011). We do not present again the stochastic system approach in
detail here (the reader is referred to the above references), but we give some examples
with the aim to show that it is essential to analyze causality in a dynamic framework.
One of the problem to which this approach brings a solution is the so-called “truncation
by death”. The approach has also the potential to better understand many epidemiolog-
ical problems, such as the “obesity paradox”.
5.2 Truncation by death
Weuve et al. (2015) have identified the problem of selection of the sample due to death
as one of the major methodological problems for studying risk factors of Alzheimer
disease or dementia, or the decrease of cognitive function in the elderly. It is not obvi-
ous to treat this problem, which may also arise in other studies of severe diseases, like
cancer for instance. This problem was tackled by Rubin (2006) using potential out-
comes and principal stratification (Frangakis and Rubin, 2002); the proposed estimand
is the survival average causal effect (SACE). The relevance of principal stratification
in some applications has been questioned by Pearl (2011) to which several authors
have reacted; in particular, VanderWeele (2011) noted that the SACE is not identified
because it is not known which individuals are in the principal stratum.
A solution to this problem in the stochastic system approach to causality has been
proposed by Commenges (2018). The factors of interest are represented by stochastic
processes. Using the possibility of studying local influence on a random time, the local
influence of a factor V on a marker or disease Y is studied until the time of death.
Here, Y could represent dementia or cognitive ability and V blood pressure. A graph
of influence between stochastic processes can be built. A typical graph is displayed in
Figure 2. The graphical convention is that stochastic processes are symbolized by large
filled circles, attributes represented by random variables are symbolized by squares and
death which is a particular process by a star.
In the principle, this is really straightforward; practical realization of such an anal-
ysis relies on developing a careful joint model for Y and death (Rizopoulos, 2010;
Proust-Lima et al., 2015, 2016).
5.3 The obesity paradox in Diabetic patients: need for a dynamic
approach
It is well known that obesity increases the risk of mortality (Aune et al., 2016) in the
general population. There has been, however, a debate around the so-called “obesity
paradox” arising from findings that in certain populations, obese subjects appear to
have a lower death rate; Carnethon et al. (2012) found a hazard ratio of less than 0.5 for
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V 
G Y 
Figure 2: Influence graph for a physiological process Y , D (death, represented by a
star), a factor V (blood pressure) and attributes G (gender, genetic factors): large filled
circles are stochastic processes, and squares are random variables.
overweight/obese subjects. A possible explanation invokes a collider bias, stemming
from the fact that many analyzes of mortality among diabetes implicitly condition on
diabetes status which may be a collider on the path between obesity and death in pres-
ence of a confounder; see Figure 3. It is, however, controversial that this can explain
the paradox (Sperrin et al., 2016; Viallon and Dufournet, 2017).
Our point in this problem, is that a modeling through random variables is not well
fitted for revealing causal pathways. Indeed, the two factors studied, obesity and dia-
betes may vary in time, and death itself is an event which occurs at a certain time, so
that all three phenomena are better represented by stochastic processes. A first graphi-
cal representation can be the same as in Figure 2, where V would represent obesity and
Y diabetes: the graph is similar to that of Figure 3 (except for the optional arrow from
G to V , with the important difference that the nodes are stochastic processes rather
than random variables.
5.3.1 Selection bias
In the dynamic version there can be a bias analogous to the collider bias even in the
simpler case where G influences only death. This is represented in Figure 4; moreover,
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Figure 3: Influence graph for diabetes Y , deathD, obesity V and a possible confounder
G, all treated as random variables (small filled circles), as in Sperrin et al. (2016).
in the following discussion we do not use the fact that V influences Y and tha Y
influences death. The potential bias comes from the well known selection of the frailty
(Aalen et al., 2008). Here we assume that V (obesity) is represented by a binary random
variable andG takes the role of a frailty. If we assume that conditional onG the hazards
are proportional to V , marginally the hazard ratio decreases; it may even cross the level
of 1. Aalen et al. (2008) (Section 6.5.1) studies the case where the frailty has a gamma
distribution and the hazard ratio decreases. In such a case, if we start at the time origin,
the effect on the survival probability cannot change direction. If, however, we start after
or near the time where the hazard ratio crosses the level 1, we observe an effect in the
reverse direction! In the case of obesity, it could happen that obese subjects reaching a
certain age are selected to a point that their risk of death is less than non-obese subjects.
This may happen if we take a sample of subjects presenting a pathology that happens
relatively late, such as type-II diabetes.
5.3.2 Feedback effect
With the stochastic system approach the influence graph is not necessarily a DAG,
that is, is not necessarily acyclic. This allows to represent feedback effects (or inverse
causation), which means in our application a direct or indirect effect of diabetes on
14
V 
G Y 
Figure 4: Influence graph for diabetes (Y ), death (star), obesity (V ) and a possible
confounder (G).
obesity. The physiological possibility of a direct effect would mean that a severe level
of diabetes could induce a loss of weight (possibly by insulino-resistance). Indirect
effects are possible through two different mechanisms: (i) diabetes could favor diseases
like cancer that could induce weight loss together with increased mortality rate; (ii) a
medical intervention for reducing weight could take place in severe diabetes. This latter
point is related to the indication bias or “dynamic confounding” (see Section 4.5). So,
the influence graph could be as in Figure 5. Knudtson et al. (2005) have documented
both direct and indirect effects of diabetes on obesity showing that “persons who lost
weight had higher rates of a history of cardiovascular disease and diabete”. Moreover,
they reported higher mortality rates in subjects having experienced a weight loss. The
consequence of these biases is that if we take sample of diabetic patients, the more
sever case may have lost weight while they have a higher mortality rate resulting in the
“obesity paradox”, if severity of the diabetes is not taken into account.
For inference we would need longitudinal data, in particular for weight. In such an
analysis, the problem of truncation by death would also arise (see Section 5.2).
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Figure 5: Influence graph for diabetes Y , death (star), obesity V and a possible con-
founder G; A may represent either a disease or a treatment.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that we can answer causal questions without potential outcome. Coun-
terfactual questions are not the most interesting but even counterfactual questions can
be answered without potential outcome. We have discussed seven issues about the
potential outcome approach and shown that causal effects could be defined without it.
We have put forward the need of a dynamic approach to causality. The issue how
to deal with death is important in many epidemiological studies. Only a dynamic ap-
proach can yield a satisfactory solution to this problem. Finally we have examined the
example of the obesity paradox. In this problem a dynamic approach allows analyzing
different mechanisms that could explain it. The two main mechanisms are the frailty
selection and reverse causation; the latter can be direct or indirect; the indirect reverse
causation could be due either to a disease or a treatment. The reverse causation ar-
gument is more convincing if the representation of diabetes (Y) allows to distinguish
different levels of severity (either by a quantitative process or a multivariate process).
The different shapes of the risk of death for studies of different mean follow-up times
found by Aune et al. (2016) can be explained by the two mechanisms: less selection
and less confounding reverse causation (pre-diagnosis weight-loss) in studies with long
16
follow-up.
We think that many epidemiological problems would benefit from a dynamic anal-
ysis: the obesity paradox occurs in other groups than diabetes; the healthy worker
effect is also itself a paradox that can be explained dynamically. Dynamical analysis
of causality can take two forms: a theoretical analysis as presented here for the obe-
sity paradox; the development of joint models that would allow making inference from
longitudinal data. The two forms should cross-fertilize each-other
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